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Abstract 
This paper refers to two recent political phenomena: the Brexit, separation of the United 
Kingdom from the European Union, and the election of Donald Trump as President of the 
United States. It is important to note that the results on both occasions did not meet the 
expectations based on opinion polls, on one hand, and, on the other, seemed to be influenced 
by the adoption of populist attitudes by some of the people and parties involved. It is therefore 
necessary to deepen the knowledge about the two situations, their fundamentals and their 
outcomes. That is the objective of this paper. To gather published information and try to use it 
for the understanding of the results based on existing theories and thoughts. 
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Introduction  
The political geography seems to be changing (Buhaug, et al., 2016) with the Brexit, that will 
lead to the separation between the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as with 
Donald Trump’s victory in the American presidential elections at the end of 2016. Disruptive 
phenomena are normally associated with economic stagnation or depression in the past. These 
create conditions for strong expansionist programs, where redistribution is the key word, as 
stated in the initial work of Dornbush and Edwards (1990). But that was not the case in the two 
situations mentioned, even though both the UK and the United States have suffered the effects 
of both the sub-prime crisis initiated in the USA in 2007 and had been hit by the progressive 
globalization and commercial openness, with social consequences that are being evaluated. 
Traditionally, international commerce has been described by economic theories as a source of 
progress and increase in efficiency among countries (Gilpin, 2016; Broadberry, et al., 2016; 
Clarke et al., 2017). However, the experiences of Brexit and, even more strongly, the election 
of Donald Trump in the United States, should drive our attention to the sensation of many 
citizens that feel being excluded by the system that may not have protected them as they were 
expecting. As a matter of fact, negativity towards the institutions of formal politics is currently 
a concern across much of the democratic world (Clarke and Ricketts, 2017). 
Europe and the United States have beneficiated from half a century of prosperity and growth 
practically since the end of the Second World War until the sub-prime crisis. The increased 
liberalization of the world trade and the globalization of the economy resulted in strong gains 
for the economies of these two countries, only momentarily interrupted by the oil crisis that 
occurred in between. And both the USA and the UK recovered quickly from the sub-prime 
crisis, as the improvement in economic indicators shows. Thus, the general economic situation 
of both countries when the referendum on Brexit and the election of Donald Trump occurred 
were good. Those weren’t, in fact, periods of economic recession or accelerated 
unemployment. Other factors emerged, namely populism, with long time prospects that should 
be studied. In fact, the current surge of populism in Europe and the US is a significant 
challenge not only for mainstream political parties but, more importantly, for the prosperity 
and political stability of advanced economies across the world (Andersen et al., 2017). Since 
2016 and 2017, there is a proficient literature about the Brexit phenomenon and the Donald 
Trump election on USA from various field of science, but none of these deals with the social-
economic fundamentals and the citizen’s attitudes that are in the basis of Brexit and Trump’s 
election. 
The problem of this paper is how to prevent "new" populist movements and what causes / 
theories are at their origin. Do the current theories explain these phenomena or not? 
The objective of this study is then to contribute to the identification of the causes that 
originated these social attitudes in such different social and political contexts as were lived in 
the UK and the USA at the time and find the theories that may explain the observed changes. 
From the Latin American Populism to the protest vote in the UK and the 
Trump’s election 
The pioneering work from Dornbusch and Edwards, (1990) about macroeconomic populism 
analysed the two populist economic programs, in Chile, during Allende’s Unidad Popular 
(1970-1973) government, and Peru, under Alan Garcia´s rule.  According to these authors, the 
initial condition for the implementation of both programs was the dissatisfaction of citizens 
with the country’s growth performance. Most typically, though not always, the countries had 
experienced moderate growth, stagnation or outright depression as a result of previous 
stabilization attempts. Once the debate was initiated, a number of studies were developed, 
mainly in Latin America, with the aim of determining the main causes and the consequences of 
populist policies. Damill, et al. (2015) analysed macroeconomic policy in Argentina in the 
period starting in 2002. The results, based on panel time-series data and analysis, confirm the 
prediction that recently elected governments coming into power after periods of political 
dictatorship, and which are faced with demand for redistribution, end up engaging in populist 
(or redistributive) policies, which tend to lead to high inflation and overall poor 
macroeconomic performance. Fonseca (2011) confirmed these results for Brazil in the time of 
Vargas' economic populism. According to this author, the Second Vargas Administration in 
Brazil (1951-1954) is commonly associated with the phenomenon of populism. The author 
concludes that “besides, based on this historic experience, it is advocated that there is no 
incompatibility between developmentalism and the adoption of macroeconomic stability-
oriented measures”. With the recent economic crisis, conditional lending and mandatory 
structural reforms arrived in the European Union. On the opposite way in European countries 
“with the recent economic crisis, conditional lending and mandatory structural reforms arrived 
in the European Union. Greece and a number of other crisis countries were subjected to a 
rigorous process of economic adjustment in exchange for emergency credits from the troika 
(European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund)” 
(Hermann, 2016). With the recent economic crisis, conditional lending and mandatory 
structural reforms arrived in the European Union. (Hermann, 2016).  
Populism is conceived of as a political style essentially displaying proximity of the people, 
while at the same time taking an anti-establishment stance and stressing the (ideal) 
homogeneity of the people by excluding specific population segments. Second, it is pointed out 
that defining populism as a style enables one to turn it into a useful concept that has too often 
remained vague and blurred. (Jagers, and Walgrave, 2007; Abts and Rummens, 2007). 
Although these phenomena were initially associated with economic recession or depression, 
instability, and inflation in Latin America, their political geography changed to North America 
and Europe, the most recent examples being Brexit, Trump’s elections, but also the growth of 
populist parties in The Netherlands, France, Austria, Italy, Germany, Hungary and so on, 
despite the fact that macroeconomic and social conditions are substantially different from the 
ones that were in the basis of the populist movements in South America. Scholars of 
contemporary Europe's Mediterranean strategy note that efforts by Europe to link with its 
southern neighbors do more than simply establish norms for external relations. They are also 
used to define what (and where) Europe is (Steinberg, 2016). However, in recent times, the 
warlike conflicts in the Mediterranean countries and the growing wave of migrants have 
somehow conditioned the policies in Europe and had effects in Trump voters. According to 
Steinberg (2016), Notwithstanding this dream of free and peaceful commerce across a tamed 
inland sea, whenever there is interaction there is also the potential for hostility. As such, just as 
the designation of the Arctic as a Polar Mediterranean is used to promote a vision of Europe 
(and North America) peacefully extending its frontiers, it is also used to suggest a vision of the 
inland sea as an arena of conflict. In the last three years, the number of deaths from war has 
once again risen, mainly due to the bloody civil war in Syria (Gleditsch, Nordås, 2014). This 
war has had profound impacts at the European and American political level, which is difficult 
to predict at the level of the voters' sense of voting. States had engaged in a variety of border 
enforcement practices to reassert control over migration and territory in spite of international 
human rights obligations. State responses to asylum seeking are illustrative of the subsequent 
movement and proliferation of borders far from the territorial borderline (Gorman, 2017).  
Methodology and data 
The methodology includes a qualitative and quantitative analysis. At the quantitative level 
analysis, a study was carried out of all scientific papers published in the SCOPUS indexed 
database and the Social Science Citation Index and Web of Science, which included 116 papers 
in the different scientific areas published between 2016 and 2017. After were selected all those 
scientific papers included in the Social Sciences / Economic / Econometric / Miscellaneous / 
and Management scopes. All these works are duly analysed and referenced in this work. At the 
level of the quantitative analysis, two types of analysis were performed: a univariate analysis 
and an econometric analysis with the ARIMA model (in progress). Univariate analysis 
includes two distinct procedures. First, the macroeconomic indicators were analysed on the 
basis of OECD databases; The World Bank and the European Commission, referring to the 
years 2009 and 2016. Secondly, the data concerning the Ipsos Public Affairs Inquiry for the 
database on the economic situation in UK and USA were analyzed. The ARIMA Econometric 
model was based on data referring to the years 2009 to 2016 regarding the socio-economic and 
political conditions that foster these populist movements. The variables include a formed panel 
data based on quantitative indicators for 32 European countries and the United States as a 
comparative term. The variables include economic indicators relating to educational levels 
(EDU) of citizens; Indicators for economic growth (GDP) (GDP growth rate); Employment 
scientific (SE). At the level of investment of GDP in R&D, as well as social data such as 
average annual average income and by category (YA). In addition, we created a dummy 
variable that evoked the existence of extreme phenomena in 2016 (EX), as well as a trend 
variable @TREND. The econometric model was based on Choi and Varian (2009) made use of 
simple autoregressive models augmented by the index taking the following form: AR-1 model 
yt=b1yt-1 +b9yt-9 +eu for the period 2009 a 2016. 
      (1) 
Where yt is the value of the series under investigation year t; yt-1 is the value of that series in 
the previous year yt-9 is the value of the serie of 9 years earlier and xt is the value of the series 
of 9 years earlier and xt value of the dummy trends query for the terms associated with the 
series. 
Because simple fixed annual dummies may offer an alternative approach to the modelling of 
the populism movements in the studied countries, for each data term we began with a general 
unrestricted model (2) according Choi and Varian (2009) that included a secular time trend 
(TREND) and fixed annuals dummies (Sj) as well as the 1-period and 9-period lags of the 
dependent variable (POPU) and the value of the relevant value of populism searched. 
      (2) 
Results and Discussion 
Socio-Economic conditions in the UK and the USA 
Table 1 presents the main economic indicators in USA and UK in 2009 and 2016, during and 
after the subprime crisis. Recession in the USA reached -8% of GDP, -2.3% in the United 
Kingdom. Results started to improve in 2010, though, and it could be said that there is now a 
moderate economic growth. Unemployment among young people was strongly affected, 
reaching 16 and 20%, respectively, in the United States and the UK, in 2009. And it decreased 
to 11 and 13% after 2010. Despite the improvement, the rate of young people that cannot find a 
job is still 6 to 8 points higher than general unemployment in those countries. On the other 
hand, trade balance was always negative, increasing 50% in the USA from 2009 to 2016. The 
UK performed better, with a decrease of around 10% along the same period. 
Economic data USA UK 
2009 2016 2009 2016 
GDP grow rate (%) -8 2 -2,3 1,5 
Balance of trade (millions of $ 
(USA) or (GBP in UK) 
-30000 -45000 -5800 -5200 
Unemployment rate (%) 5,3 5,0 6,1 5,1 
Inflation Rate (%) -2 3 2 0,2 
Debt to GDP (%) 95,2 104,7 65,7 89,2 
Youth Unemployment Rate (%) 16 11 20 13 
Productivity (Index Points) 98 106 98,5 108,5 
Private Debt to GDP (%) 212,28 197,2 237,8 229,5 
Table 1. Economic outlook of USA and UK Source: OECD, 2016. 
Socio-Economics Characteristics of the Brexit voters 
 
As for the socio-economic characteristics of the voters favouring Brexit, it is possible, 
according to Brooks et al., 2016 and O'Reilly et al., (2016), to distinguish them by socio-
professional characteristics, such as the profession associated with educational level, level of 
wealth (heritage) and religious factors. Nearly two thirds of manual workers (64%) voted 
“Leave”, and their voice was augmented by approximately half of the middle classes with the 
same behaviour. The majority of the professionals and managerial classes (57%) voted 
“Remain”. An observation of the housing characteristics of “Leave” voters illustrates this 
unusual 'contradictory coalition'. Most of those who owned their own home, without a 
mortgage (most likely older voters and the very rich), and two thirds of council and housing 
association tenants voted “Leave”. Homeowners with a mortgage voted “Remain”. 
Gender divisions did not prove evident, but ethnic divisions were; and they were also 
fractured. White voters were slightly more likely to vote “Leave” (53%) than to vote “Remain” 
(47%). Two thirds (67%) of those describing themselves as Asian voted to remain, as did three 
quarters (73%) of black voters. Nearly 6 in 10 (58%) of those describing themselves as 
Christians voted to leave, while 7 in 10 Muslims voted “Remain”. However, some migrants 
from the Commonwealth voted “Leave” only because they wanted a fairer system of migration 
that did not give preferential treatment to East Europeans over people from their own countries 
(Parveen, 2016; O'Reilly et al., 2016). The economic crisis, the refugee crisis, pressures on the 
Euro and immigration, combine to stress the shortcomings of the EU. Brexit is also one kind of 
expression of democracy. Inglehart and Norris (2016) analyses whether populist support is 
associated with economic or cultural variables. Their results confirm that cultural values are 
consistent predictors of support for populist parties strengthened by anti-immigrant attitudes, 
mistrust of global and national governance, support for authoritarian values, and left-right 
ideological self-placement. According to Andersen et al. (2016), economic indicators are not 
reliable predictors. It thus seems likely that economic policies have not directly led to a 
populist backlash, but have indirectly reinforced it, by creating a world of greater labour 
mobility, and growing prominence of supranational government. The current surge of 
populism in Europe and the US is a significant challenge, not only for mainstream political 
parties but, more importantly, for the prosperity and political stability of advanced economies 
across the world. 
The main factor that explains the Brexit was the lower educational level of the population and 
lack of investment in education (Streeck, 2014). In fact, UK, together with Greece, has the 
lowest share of secondary education students learning two or more languages, below 10% and 
decreasing since 2009. (EUROSTAT, 2016; Streeck, 2014). Meanwhile, good reasons existed 
for some section of the population to vote for Brexit. If the EU and the elites do not protect 
citizens from the crisis and economic difficulties, why bother? The Brexit vote most 
importantly underlines income and territorial inequalities, a growing cleavage between 
globalization winners and losers and a profound Brexistential crisis about the future of the 
Union European (Le Galès, 2016). 
Socio-economics characteristics and attitudes of the Trump voters 
 
As for the socio-economic characteristics and attitudes of the voters of Trump election (Table 
2 and Table 3), it is possible to distinguish them by socio-professional characteristics, such as 
gender, race, age, education, geographical location of the voters, religion, the profession 
associated with educational level, and attitudes about the situation and the future of the 
country, immigration and openness to international trade and mistrust towards mainstream 
politicians: voters have serious mistrust about the qualities of the politician in which they vote 
and political ideology is mainly conservative in Trump voters. Trump voters are mainly 
politically conservative, male (52%), 45-64 years old (53%) and 65 and over years (53%), less 
educated (51% of people having high school or lower degrees, and 52% of those some 
college/associate degree), 50% of voters with average income in the $50,000 - $99,999 
bracket. The low-income voters, receiving under $30,000 or between 30,000 - $49,999$ voted 
mainly for Clinton. One other characteristics of Trump was place of residence - the majority 
lives in suburbs (50%) and small city or rural areas (62%) - religion - Protestant or other 
Christian (58%) or Catholic (52%), while Clinton attracted 62% of voters with no religion and 
69% of those with other religious belief. As far as attitudes and values, 69% of the Trump 
voters consider that the direction of the country is seriously off track, they are mainly 
concerned with the emigration (64%) and worried about the economic situation of the country 
(42%). When asked about the family financial situation, they consider that it is worse today 
(78%) and expect for the next generation of Americans to have a worse life than today (63%). 
About 65% consider that the effect of trade openness with other countries on U.S. jobs takes 
jobs away from American workers, 86% agree with the construction of the wall along the 
entire U.S. border with Mexico and 84% strongly agree with the deportation of illegal 
immigrants working in the U.S.A. For 84% of Trump voters the most important candidate 
quality is that he can bring needed change. These results seem to indicate that Trump voters 
correspond, on one hand, to those excluded from globalization and the system, and, on the 
other, probably to the revolt of the elites towards the political system. They are thus willing to 
take more risk and vote for a candidate with no political experience and outside the political 
mainstream. 
Voter's Socio-economic characteristics 
Gender Male  Female Gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender 
Trump (%) 53 42 14 
Clinton (%) 41 54 78 
Race White Black Hispanic/Latin Asian 
Trump (%) 58 8 29 37 
Clinton (%) 37 88 65 56 
Age 18-29 30-34 45-64 65 and over 
Trump (%) 37 42 53 53 
Clinton (%) 55 50 44 45 
Education  W 
Some college/ associate 
degree 
College graduate Postgraduate study 
Trump (%) 51 52 45 37 
Clinton (%) 45 43 49 58 
Income ($ 
/year) 
Under 
$30,000 
$30,000 - 
$49,999 
$50,000 - 
$99,999 
$100,000 - 
$199,999 
$200,000 - 
$249,999 
$250,000 or more 
Trump (%) 41 42 50 48 49 48 
Clinton (%) 53 51 46 47 48 46 
Residence City over 50,000 Suburbs Small city or rural 
Trump (%) 35 50 62 
Clinton (%) 59 45 34 
Religion Protestant or other Christian Catholic Jewish Something else None 
Trump (%) 58 52 24 29 26 
Clinton (%) 39 45 71 62 69 
Table 2. Socio-economic characteristics of the Trump and Hilary Clinton Voters. Source: from Fuchs, C. (2017) and 
Huang, J., Jacoby, S., Lai, R., and Strickland, M., (2016). 
Voter's attitudes Trump (%) Clinton (%) 
Direction of country 
Generally right direction 8 90 
Seriously off track 69 25 
Most important issue 
Foreign policy 34 60 
Immigration 64 32 
The economy 42 42 
Terrorism 57 39 
Condition of the nation's economy 
Excellent 16 83 
Good 19 76 
Fair 55 39 
Poor 79 15 
Family financial situation 
Better today 24 72 
Worse today 78 19 
About the same 46 46 
What do you expect for the next 
generation of Americans? 
Better than life today 38 59 
Worse than life today 63 31 
Condition of the nation's economy 
Excellent 16 83 
Good 19 76 
Fair 55 39 
Poor 79 15 
Effect of trade openness with other 
countries on U.S. jobs 
Takes away jobs  65 31 
What should happen to most illegal 
immigrants working in the U.S.? 
Deport 84 14 
Building a wall along the entire U.S. 
border with Mexico 
Support 86 10 
Best description of vote I like my candidate but with reservations 49 48 
Most important candidate quality Can bring needed change 83 14 
Political ideology 
Conservative 81 15 
Liberal 84 10 
Table 3. Attitudes of the Trump and Hilary Clinton Voters. Source: from Fuchs, C. (2017) and Huang, J., Jacoby, S., Lai, 
R., and Strickland, M., (2016). 
 
Results about the attitudes and perceptions of the citizens from UK and USA about the 
economic situation of the country 
 
Data are taken from Ipsos Public Affairs (2017). Citizens in the UK, USA and other 23 
countries assessed the current state of their country’s economy. The first question was: “Now, 
thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe the current economic situation 
in? Is it...”. The answers should be given in a modified Likert scale, with four possible results: 
Very good; Somewhat good; Somewhat bad and Very bad. The number of answers was a 
thousand in each of the countries involved. In Figure 1 one can see the results for the UK. 
Globally, the results show that 49% of the respondents consider the economic situation 
somewhat bad. The social-economic characterization of these respondents shows that there is a 
difference according to gender. More than 52% of women and only about 46% of man gave 
that answer. Other characteristics include 54% of people in the 50-64 years age bracket, 44% 
of those under 35 years old and 50% of respondents aged between 35-49.Also, 51% of the 
persons who answered somewhat bad were unemployed; 52% of the people with high salaries 
and 44% of those with medium and low incomes gave this answer; 52% were married, from 
whom 52% did not have a chief income earner; 52% did not occupy a senior executive place. It 
should be noted that only 37% of people in high hierarchical position were in this group of 
respondents. For 39% of the people inquired, the economic situation in the UK is somewhat 
good. 41% of these respondents were male, 37% female. This answer is equal for the highest 
age groups, with 37%, but only 34% of people under 35 years old voted this way, probably as a 
result of high unemployment in this age group; 39% belonged to a low income household, 44% 
to a high income. Votes were independent of marital status. Citizens sharing this opinion had 
mainly, 44%, low education levels. Only 34 % of medium and 39% of highly educated people 
agreed with this answer; finally, 41% of chief income earners shared the same opinion, against 
37% of not chief income earners and business owners. The economic situation is very bad only 
for a total of 8% of the respondents. There is no evidence for a gender discrepancy. But, on the 
other hand, it seems that it is within the bracket age under 35 and lower education levels that 
this answer is mostly chosen. The contrasting choice, the economy is very good, is chosen by 
only 4% of the persons, mainly among men with lower education but high income households, 
including business owners and chief income earners. 
In conclusion: the majority of the sample, 57%, in the United Kingdom considers that the 
economic situation of the country is bad or very bad. It is mainly among women, with medium 
educational level or unstable employment and lower hierarchical positions, low income, part-
time jobs and risk of unemployment, within the age bracket 35-49, that this opinion prevails. 
These results confirm the findings of O’Reilly et al. (2016) that two thirds of the voters in 
favour of the Brexit were manual workers and that their voice was reinforced by approximately 
half of the middle class (Stewart et al., 2016). 
The same question was asked in the United States to a sample of 1000 inhabitants according to 
Ipsos Public Affairs (2017) methodology. The results, shown in Figure 3, confirm significant 
differences in the perception of American citizens when compared to their British counterparts. 
As a matter of fact, 52% of the people submitted to the questionnaire considers that the 
economic situation in the USA is good or very good. It mainly is among males (59%), aged 
under 35 (63%) – in contrast to the 48% of those between 35 and 49, or 43% older than 49 – 
married (52%), living within high income households, and with a Chief Income Earner (77%), 
Business Owners or Senior Executives (78%), with higher education (67%) that this opinion 
prevails. As far as geography is concerned, these results are favorable especially in the US 
Midwest Region (54%), US South Region (53%) and US West Region (53%), being smaller in 
the US Northeast Region (48%). 
 
Figure 1. Economic situation in UK, 2017 (Source: Ipsos Public Affairs (2017). 
 
 
Figure 2. Economic situation in USA, 2017 (Source: Ipsos Public Affairs (2017). 
Possible explanations of the results 
Several authors tried to forward explanations for the results of the elections: Clarke, and 
Ricketts, (2016) through the return of the Jacksonian tradition; (Newmann, 1957; Neumann et 
al., 2013).) using the critical theory. Clarkeand Ricketts (2016) concluded that in many 
respects, the 2016 presidential race witnessed the return of Jacksonian sentiment to center 
stage in American politics to challenge the post-Cold War consensus on foreign policy. 
Although these results refer to the UK, their conjugation with the factors based on the 
Jacksonian theory, may partly explain Trump’s election, which cannot be based on the 
economic factors, since, as previously stated, most the respondents to the Ipsos Public Affairs 
inquiry (2017) considers them to be good or very good. It may be added that they also express 
that the economy is not their main source of worries, since the negative effects of the subprime 
crisis seem to be surpassed. On the contrary, in the UK, the inquiry shows that the majority 
(57%) of the respondents consider the economic situation in the country bad or very bad. On 
the other hand, economic indicators show that the subprime crisis negatively affected the 
economy. Young people were among the most affected, despite their academic qualifications 
and thus the Prospect Theory was not confirmed. However, older less educated persons opted 
to vote for Brexit, as their American counterparts voted for Trump. It may be concluded that 
the Jacksonian Theory may be applied in both situations, with people expressing negative 
feelings towards formal political institutions, be them national, in the case of the USA and UK, 
or supranational, in the case of the UK. At economic level the Prospect Theory proposed by 
Kahneman, and Tversky, (1979) could explain these electoral or referendum phenomena. 
Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the 
basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes are merely probable 
in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the 
certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking 
in choices involving sure losses. The application of the Prospect Theory to the results of the 
Presidential Elections in the United States and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom 
would justify that voters who faced negative experiences in the past are more receptive to vote 
in a riskier proposal (whose consequences they do not entirely know), but that offers them 
higher potential of additional gains, instead of choosing a safer alternative with smaller 
potential advantages. Fuchs, (2017) based on Neumann, (1957) and Neumann et al., (2013) 
explain the Trump election on the basis of the Critical Theory, namely, in such situations, the 
“fear of social degradation […] creates for itself ‘a target for the discharge of the resentments 
arising from damaged self-esteem’”. persecutory anxiety can lead to ego-surrender in the mass 
through affective identification with a leader.  
Consequences of the Brexit and Trump’s Election 
 
The analysis of the Brexit referendum reveals that the regions that voted strongly for Leave 
tended also to be those with the greatest levels of dependency on European Union markets for 
their local economic development (Galbraith, 2017). Donald Trump's victory showed how 
market reaction to populism is hard to predict. Globally, populist policies are focused more on 
immigration, trade, and governance, which are typically market negative. As such, populist 
electoral victories would imply modest downward revisions to baseline growth forecasts and 
risk greater instability. It has not been the case so far. Populist electoral victories in Europe 
would result in unsettling brinksmanship and provide an existential threat to the EU, though 
compromise is the most likely outcome since subsequent risks are two-sided.  
Conclusion 
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and the Brexit, separation of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union must be seen as the result of a complex 
situation involving social, political and economic aspects. Firstly, it is evident that there is a 
growing mistrust of a large part of the citizens on traditional institutions, political parties and 
long term politicians, be them national, in the case of the United States, or national and 
supranational, in the case of the United Kingdom. Secondly, citizens tend to feel that, in some 
way, they have been abandoned by the state to the effects of globalization and immigration 
without any effort being made to protect them. This in turn justifies the support for policies 
based on isolation and the growing believe that, on their own, with restrictive trade and 
immigration policies, both the United States and the United Kingdom would perform better. 
Finally, it is also evident from the study that the groups that favored Trump’s election and the 
Brexit are those who think have more to lose with the current policies and are, therefore, open 
to try other ways, even if they may doubt the outcome. 
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